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PORTUGESE AFRICA: A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNITED
NATIONS INVOLVEMENT
"Let him who will portray me, but let him not malign me; for patience
is very often lost when insults are heaped upon it."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A necessary prerequisite to any examination of Portuguese pol-
icy, in particular one concerning the Overseas Provinces, is an admis-
sion that Americans, in general, have yet to attain a realistic under-
standing of Iberian civilization. Traditionally, discussions of Portugal
labored under the shadow of what has recently been recognized as the
"Black Legend" (Leyenda Negra). Professor Philip Wayne Powell
observes that the fundamental premise of the "Black Legend" is that
Iberian people are "uniquely cruel, bigoted, tyrannical, obscurantist,
lazy, fanatical, greedy, and treacherous."2 Further, the illusion of.a
true Portuguese union with Spain under Philip II from 1580 to 1640,
often led to the mistaken equation of Portuguese explorative achieve-
ments with the unfortunate adventures of Spain in the New World.
3
Such misunderstanding predisposed many to uncritically accept alle-
gations of Portuguese injustice whenever presented in a colonial con-
text. John Tate Lanning writes that "the English language historian
who deals with (Iberian) civilization and culture has to think as much
of how he is going to grapple with the bias of his public as he does of
finding what the case is."' Hopefully, present scholarship should pro-
vide an adequate caveat against continuation of past histrionics.
H. LEGAL STATUS OF PORTUGUESE AFRICA UNDER CHAPTER XI OF THE
U.N. CHARTER
Under its present constitution, approved by popular vote in Met-
ropolitan Portugal and Overseas Provinces in 1933, Portugal is a uni-
tary republic consisting of the following territories: (1) in Europe: the
Metropole of Portugal, the Archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores;
(2) in Africa: Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Ca-
binda, Angola, S. Joao Baptista de Ajuda, S. Tome and Principe; (3)
in Asia: Goa (Istado da India) and Macau; and (4) in Oceania:
Timor.5 The Republic of Portugal, under this constitutional composi-
1. M. CERVANTES, DON QUIxoT, pt. II, ch. 59.
2. P. W. POWELL, TREE OF HATE: PROPAGANDA AND PREJUDICE AFFECTING UNITED
STATES RELATIONS WITH THE HISPANIC WORLD 11, 3, 169 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
POWELLI.
3. J. VERzITJ, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORlCAL PERSPECTIVE 134 (1969).
4. POWELL, supra note 2, at 131.
5. For English text of Portuguese Constitution of April 11, 1933, as amended to
1959, see A. PEASLEE, 3 CoNsTrrrrIONS OF NATIONS 725 (1968).
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tion, was admitted to the United Nations on December 14, 1955.' The
seizure of Goa and S. Joao Baptista de Ajuda, by India and Senegal
respectively, during the 1960's is not recognized by Portugal. Both are
considered under military occupation by foreign powers and Goa re-
tains its representation in the Portugese National Assembly.
7
Member States of the United Nations, responsible for adminis-
tration of areas designated as non-self-governing territories, are obli-
gated to transmit information concerning social and economic condi-
tions of such territories to the Secretary General pursuant to Chapter
XI of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly in 1956, the Secretary
General requested of Portugal "whether there are any territories re-
ferred to in Article 73 of the Charter for the administration of which
it has responsibility."8 Portugal replied that it "does not administer
territories which fall under the category indicated by Article 73."9
During 1957, the Fourth Committee (dealing with colonial and trus-
teeship matters) considered transmission of information pursuant to
Chapter XI by new members. Discussion focused upon whether the
General Assembly could assume responsibility for an objective exam-
ination of the obligation of any new member (Portugal in particular)
to submit information under Chapter XI." A Fourth Committee reso-
lution to create an ad hoc committee to study the application of the
provisions of Chapter XI in regard to new members was defeated by
the General Assembly." Such action by the Fourth Committee was
not customary. Since 1948, when eight member nations transmitted
information in regard to 74 territories, designation of territories as
non-self-governing was understood to be the exclusive right of the
administering country.'" The suggestion that this right should now
pass to the General Assembly was unprecedented. The Representa-
tive of Portugal explained that his country was a unitary state under
a unitary constitution with the Metropole and Overseas Provinces
under the identical organs of sovereignty and the same status under
international law.'" When Portugal was admitted to the United Na-
6. 1958 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONs 27.
7. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, FACT SHEET ON PORTUGAL: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANCES 3 (1972). (Material available from the American representative of Overseas
Companies of Portugal, Downs & Roosevelt, Inc., Washington, D.C.)
8. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/331/Add.1,2 (1956).
9. Id.
10. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/345 (1957).
11. U.N. Doc. A/3531/Add.1 (1957).
12. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/347 (1957).
13. Some members of the Fourth Committee alleged that Portugal had tradition-
ally used the term "colonies" in regard to its overseas territories and only changed the
designation to "Overseas Provinces" in 1951. The first references to "Overseas Prov-
inces" in official Portuguese documents were in 1576 and 1633. The term was employed
in the Constitutions of 1820, 1832, 1842, the overseas legislation of 1867 and the Consti-
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tions, the Portuguese Constitution was known to its members and
there could be no misunderstanding as to the political structure or
territorial composition of Portugal. It was beyond the competence of
the General Assembly to question the constitutional structure or ter-
ritorial extension of any member state once it had been admitted to
the United Nations. The Portuguese government was and would con-
tinue to furnish extensive information to specialized agencies of the
United Nations, however to do so under Chapter XI would be in
abrogation of its own national constitution. 4
Although future debate would involve Portugal's failure to pro-
vide information on its Overseas Provinces, the substantial issue did
not concern quantums of information. From its admission, Portugal
submitted reports on its Overseas Provinces to the Economic and
Social Council, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the
United Nations Library.' The real issue confronting the General As-
sembly by the Fourth Committee proposal was whether the Assembly
could disregard the constitutional structure of a member nation and
determine that nation's territorial composition. The Portuguese Con-
stitution did not recognize the existence of territories within the na-
tion with different legal status. Portugal maintained that the inter-
pretation and application of a member nation's constitution was the
exclusive right of the respective country. General Assembly interfer-
ence constituted a "flagrant violation" of Article 2(1) (sovereign
equality of all members) and Article 2(7) (U.N. intervention in mat-
ters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states
precluded). 1 The Fourth Committee resubmitted the resolution ex-
plaining it was necessary to interpret Chapter XI in relation to: (1)
the scope of the constitutional limitation clause in Chapter XI; (2)
whether Chapter XI included territories incorporated as part of the
metropolitan country; and (3) whether the General Assembly could
itself define territories as non-self-governing. The General Assembly
again rejected the draft resolution, failing to obtain a required two-
tutions of 1911 and 1933. Although the term "colony" was used for a short period in
modern texts, this did not change the status of the provinces under Portuguese law.
An early seventeenth century ruling of the Portuguese Royal Council reads in part that
"Goa and the other lands overseas with whose Governments this Council is concerned
are not distinct nor separate from this realm ... and thus he who is born and lives in
Goa or in Brazil or in Angola is just as much a Portuguese as he who lives and is born
in Lisbon."
14. U.N. Doc. A/C.4/347 (1957). See also PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTRY, PoRTu-
GAL REPLIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 3-4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PORTUGAL REPLIES].
15. F. NOGUEIRA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PORTUGAL: A STUDY OF ANTI-
COLONIALISM 84 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NOGUEIRA].
16. Id. at 78-79.
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thirds majority vote.'7
The composition of the General Assembly in 1960, altered by the
admission of eighteen newly independent states, gave a clear majority
on the Portuguese question to the developing nations. Early in the
session the Special Committee of Six, maintaining the Charter "was
a living document and the obligations under Chapter XI must be
viewed in the light of the changing spirit of the times," submitted
principles to guide members in determining whether there existed an
obligation on their part to transmit information concerning non-self-
governing territories under Chapter XI.' s These principles were: (1)
there exists a prima facia obligation to transmit information on terri-
tories geographically separate and ethnically or culturally distinct
from the administering state; (2) full self-government can only be
attained by independence, free association or integration; and (3)
constitutional limitations enumerated in Chapter XI concerned only
the quantum of information to be provided.'9 The General Assembly
accepted the principles submitted by the Special Committee of Six,
and in its companion resolution, unilaterally designated the Overseas
Provinces of Portugal to be non-self-governing territories.2 Portugal
was now obligated to transmit information on those areas without
further delay.2 '
During the debate which surrounded adoption of Resolutions
1541(XV) and 1542(XV), Portugal maintained such action by the
General Assembly was not authorized by the Charter, was ultra vires
and that members of the General Assembly were applying a political
interpretation to the Charter. Portugal insisted that only a legal in-
terpretation of Chapter XI by the International Court of Justice or
an amendment of the Charter would ensure a successful resolution of
the problem.2 2 Portugal laid great stress upon the wording of the first
draft of the Report of the Committee of Six, wherein the Committee,
after having noted the difficulties involved in finding a satisfactory
definition of the concept of "territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government" and that anyway, it "was
not essential to arrive at a definition," said it "approached the prob-
lem from a practical point of view, bearing in mind the political
17. U.N. Doc. A/3733 (1957).
18. U.N. Doc. A/4526 (1960). The committee consisted of representatives from
India, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
19. Id.
20. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
21. G.A. Res, 1542, 15 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960). The territories so
designated were Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, S. Tome and Principe, S. Joao Bap-
tista de Ajuda, Goa, Macau and the Cape Verde Archipelago. Conspicuously absent
were the Archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores.
22. NOGUEIRA, supra note 15, at 351.
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realities of the world situation." ' Portugal also found the selection
by the General Assembly of racial and cultural factors as criteria for
determination of non-self-governing territories a contradiction of
basic principles of the United Nations. That political separation
should necessarily arise because of racial and cultural differences was
viewed by Portugal as a stimulant to racial and cultural hostilities.
2
1
Portugal would not accept geographical separation, cultural and ra-
cial difference as sufficient to constitute a colonial situation. Instead,
Portugal claimed the General Assembly must consider each situation
on the basis of such factors as economic exploitation, disparity or
conflict of economic interests, deprivation of political, educational or
social rights and finally the imposition of a religion or culture upon a
people considered inferior.
25
A compromise between the colonial and anti-colonial powers,
Chapter XI consists of ambiguities and omissions. 21 The proposed
definitions for the principles of self-government, just treatment of
peoples, and free political institutions enumerated in Chapter XI
reflect the ideological diversity of the international community. In
attempting to define and implement, to some degree, these basic
human rights in non-self-governing territories, the General Assembly
asserted more power than a strict interpretation of Chapter XI would
authorize.2 From a legal point of view, Chapter XI does not enable
the General Assembly to determine whether a territory has attained
"self-government, ' 2 nor does it authorize the Assembly to specify
which territories are, in fact, non-self-governing. 29 Interpretations of
the Charter by the General Assembly, however, "cannot always be
defended from a legal point of view. ' 30 Although some authors suggest
the methods employed by the General Assembly to implement Chap-
ter XI "exceeds the requirements of the Chapter itself,"'3' they main-
tain that the Charter cannot be considered "a rigid, unchangeable"
legal document lacking "flexibility and adaptability.
' 3 2
23. U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/L.1 (1960).
24. NOGUEIRA, supra note 15, at 86.
25. Id. at 90.
26. Kunz, Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in Action, 48 AM. J. INT'L
L. 103, 104 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kunz].
27. Engel, The Changing Charter of the United Nations, Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS
80, 81 (1953).
28. Kunz, supra note 26, at 108-109.
29. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONs 556 (1950).
30. Kunz, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 506
(1952).
31. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 448-462 (3rd ed. 1969).
32. L. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONs 68 (1959).
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The occupation of Goa and its dependencies by the Indian Union
in 1961, not only temporarily upset the moral framework of debate
within the General Assembly in regard to the Portuguese Overseas
Provinces, but confirmed many of Portugal's fears concerning the
motives of its critics. Since Goa was among eight Portuguese territo-
ries designated as non-self-governing by Resolution 1542(XV), Portu-
gal maintained that states, like India, which voted for the resolution
were legally bound to decide the future of Goa only by terms of
Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV). After analyzing the justifica-
tions submitted by India for its action, Quincy Wright concluded that
"no interpretation of the Charter provides a legal justification" for
the occupation. 3' When the action by India was tolerated in the Gen-
eral Assembly, Portugal perceived a double standard by which it was
condemned for not respecting principles of self-determination while
other nations politically aligned with the majority were not. Portugal
concluded that "in the United Nations, self-determination is not re-
garded as a principle of political ethics but as a banner of political
action designed to achieve certain pre-selected objectives which have
nothing to do with real self-determination.' '4 In regard to the imple-
mentation of self-determination within the United Nations, S. Prak-
ash Sinha writes:
once the basic decision for political reorganization or redistribution of
power has been made, the principle of self-determination is invoked to
attain the result in a desirable fashion. The principle is thus one of
political expediency which states may or may not use.'
Any moral persuasion which past or future United Nations resolu-
tions may have achieved with Portugal was lost after the action by
India and subsequent inaction by the General Assembly. 6 By 1963,
Dr. Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal, wrote that "from
the study of this whole problem there is one inescapable conclusion
to be drawn, namely that discussion is impossible.
' 3
III. INSURGENT ACTIvrrIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE
A. Angola: 1961
Resolutions 1514 (XV), 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV) were approved
by the General Assembly during December 1960. Within a month,
minor disturbances occurred around Luanda and on March 15, 1961,
simultaneous attacks against settlements along the Congolese border
33. Wright, The Goa Incident, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 617, 630 (1962).
34. PORTUGAL REPLIES, supra note 14, at 10; see also W. KULSKI, INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 513-514 (1968).
35. Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260, 271
(1973).
36. PORTUGAL REPLIES, supra note 14, at 10.
37. NOcUETRA, supra note 15, at 120.
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in northwestern Angola were initiated by rebel forces.A" Interpreted by
many of Portugal's adversaries as a spontaneous revolt, the rebellion
was in reality a series of activities performed in accordance with a
prearranged strategy and organization." During the first week of viol-
ence hundreds of Africans of European descent and more than 6,000
black Africans were massacred by the insurgents.' One authority
observed that it was "the biggest slaughter of Europeans which has
taken place in Africa in this century,"" and another that it made "the
Congo look like a tempest in a teapot."' 2
At the outset of the attack, there were approximately 7,000 mili-
tary and policy personnel in Angola, of which 5,000 were black and
2,000 of European descent.' For the most part, these units retreated
to the large cities to undertake defensive measures until the strength
of the insurgents could be determined and reinforcements arrived
from Metropolitan Portugal." By 1962, the insurgents had been con-
tained within the densely forested areas of northwestern Angola,
where guerilla activity continues today. Immediately following the
introduction of Metropolitan troops in Angola, allegations of Portu-
guese represssion gained widespread attention. Atrocities were com-
mitted by the Portuguese, most by European settlers who had re-
cently witnessed a similar fate befall their friends and neighbors."
The majority of such acts were committed prior to entrance of Euro-
pean military units." With regard to the Portuguese army's attempt
to control this bestiality, an official British commission undertaking
on-the-spot investigations, was encouraged "by the sense of duty
38. D. WHEELER & R. PELIssIER, ANGOLA 180 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WHEELER
& PELISSIER1.
39. Id. at 177.
40. PORTUGUESE AFRICA: A HANDBOOK 407 (D. ABSHIRE & M. SAMMUELS ed. 1969)
1hereinafter cited as ABSHmE & SAMMUELS].
41. Waring, The Case for Portugal, ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM 31 (London Institute
of* Race Relations ed. 1962).
42. Clairmonte, Angola: Unfinished Duel, 53 YALE REV. 1 (1963); see also Waring,
Angola-Terrorists on the Run, NAT'L REV., Sept. 11, 1962, at 189.
43. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, PORTUGAL 1961-1971: A DECADE OF
PROGRESS 35 (1972). The size and nature of the Portuguese armed forces in Angola
during early 1961 suggest that government authorities did not foresee the coming
violence. However, other evidence indicates that the Portuguese did expect some trou-
ble. During 1959, Angola imported 156 tons of munitions; in 1960, 953 tons; in 1961,
424 tons and in 1962, 145 tons. WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 173.
44. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 407-408.
45. The insurgents hold several small areas in the Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte
districts of northwestern Angola and guerrilla infiltration continues in the Moxico
district of eastern Angola; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 201.
46. H. Kay, A Catholic View, ANGOLA: A SYMPOSIUM 67, 89 (London Institute of
Race Relations ed. 1962).
47. Id.
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among the senior officials and military commanders" it witnessed.49
B. United Nations Action
During 1961, the Security Council considered the "threat posed
to international peace and security" by these developments, 9 disre-
garding Portugal's assertion that such attention by the Security
Council was a contravention of Article 2(7) of the Charter and moti-
vated by a desire to internationalize problems of Portuguese domestic
public order for political advantage. 50 A Security Council draft resolu-
tion to investigate and report on the violence in Angola was de-
feated.5' In the General Assembly, a similar resolution, sponsored by
36 African and Asian countries, 52 to create a subcommittee to investi-
gate the "conflict and deterioration of human rights" in Angola and
call on Portugal to institute reforms within its African territories was
approved. 53 Eight months later the U.N. Subcommittee on the Situa-
tion in Angola transmitted its report to the General Assembly. The
Subcommittee found: (1) the Portuguese policy of assimilation not
accompanied by preparation of the indigenous population for citizen-
ship; (2) indications of forced labor; (3) evidence of inadequate edu-
cational facilities; (4) political organizations advocating self-
determination or independence were considered subversive and sup-
pressed;54 (5) the impossibility of discussion or negotiation with Por-
48. Id. The commission was composed of military personnel from the British
embassy in Lisbon and the consul general for Angola.
49. U.N. Doc. S/4738 (1961).
50. U.N. Doc. S/4760 (1961).
51. U.N. Doc. S/4769 (1961).
52. The sponsors were Afhganistan, Burma, Cameroun, Central African Republic,
Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Federa-
tion of Malaya, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Japan,
Lebannon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Upper
Volta. 1960 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 140.
53. G.A. Res. 1603, 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.345/Add.1-5 (1961).
54. See R. GIBSON, AF~icAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES
AGAINST MINORITY RULE (1972). The political parties basically concerned were: Movi-
mento Popular de Libertacao de Angola -(M.P.L.A.); Uniao National Para A Indepen-
dencia Total de Angola (U.N.I.T.A.); Governo Revolucionario de Angola-Frente Na-
cional de Libertacao de Angola (G.R.A.E.-F.N.L.A.); Uniao dos Populacoes de An-
gola (U.P.A.); Partido Democratico Angolamo (P.D.A.). Several observations should be
made concerning this situation: (1) by 1965, 31 of the 36 independent African nations
maintained a one-party system of government; see L. GANN & P. DUIGNAN, BURDEN OF
EMPIRE 393 (1967); (2) the parliamentary system of the Overseas Provinces is not
significantly different in this respect than that of the Metropole, making political
liberalization in the Overseas Provinces prior to that in Europe unrealistic; see
Wheeler, The Thaw in Portugal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769-781 (1970); (3) government
acceptance of such political organizations during the 1950's would, in all probability,
have greatly increased the amount of covert foreign interference; see generally M.
COPELAND, THE GAME OF NATIONS (1969); and P. LESSING, AFRICA'S RED HARVEST (1962).
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tuguese authorities "forced" nationalistic movements into clandes-
tine activity and "direct action."5 5 In response to the report, the
General Assembly affirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-
determination and independence, deprecated Portuguese repression
and violence against the people of Angola and the denial of their basic
human rights and freedoms, and requested Portugal desist from re-
pression, and undertake without delay extensive social, economic and
political reforms to enable the transfer of power to the Angolan peo-
ple. •" The debate on Angola continued in the General Assembly
through 1962 and was brought to a conclusion as a separate and
distinct problem when the General Assembly condemned "the mass
extermination of the indigenous population of Angola and other se-
vere repressive measures being used by the Portuguese colonial au-
thorities" and noted "that in the territory of Angola, as in other
Portuguese colonies, the indigenous population is denied all funda-
mental rights and freedoms, that racial discrimination is in fact
widely practiced and that the economic life of Angola is to a large
extent based on forced labor."
5 7
C. Border Incidents
Following the violence in Angola, various African nations at-
tempted to escalate the situation in Angola to an international crisis
through allegations of aggression by Portuguese military units against
neighboring countries. In 1961, Senegal charged in the Security
Council that Portuguese army units entered a Senegalese village and
motorized columns accompanied by jet fighters penetrated other
Senegalese territory.50 Portugal denied the allegation and explained
that a routine reconnaissance patrol had become lost for a short time
in Senegalese territory and the overflight of two jet aircraft, due to
technical problems in navigation, had lasted no longer than 30 sec-
onds. 59 In 1963, Senegal informed the Security Council that Portu-
guese military aircraft bombed a Senegalese village, but was uncer-
tain as to the amount of damage and date of attack.60 Portugal denied
the charge and requested the Security Council establish a neutral
commission to investigate in loco the Senegalese complaint.6 In-
stead, the Security Council deplored "any incursion by Portuguese
forces into Senegalese territory as well as [this] incident.""2 In 1965,
55. U.N. Doc. S/4993/Corr.1 (1962); U.N. Doc. A/4978/Corr.1 (1962).
56. G.A. Res. 1742, 16 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.384/Rev.1 (1962).
57. G.A. Res. 1819, 17 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. AIL.415/Add.1 (1962).
58. U.N. Doc. S/5039 (1961).
59. U.N. Doc. S/5055 (1961).
60. U.N. Doc. S/5279 (1963); U.N. Doc. S/5283 (1963).
61. U.N. Doc. S/5281 (1963); U.N. Doc. S/5284 (1963).
62. U.N. Doc. S/5293 (1963).
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Senegal continued allegations of Portuguese military incursions into
Senegalese territory. 3 Portugal again denied the charges and re-
quested the United Nations investigate such allegations to reduce the
increasing tension between the two nations." The Security Council
unanimously deplored "any incursion by Portuguese military forces
into Senegalese territory," and requested Portugal "take all effective
and necessary action to prevent any violation of Senegal's sovereignty
and territorial integrity."65
In 1966, the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged Portugal
with allowing Angola to be employed as a military base for mercenary
operations against the Congolese government. While denying the
allegation, Portugal informed the Council that official Congolese in-
formation organs were instigating violence against the Portuguese
community in the Congo-the Portuguese embassy in Kinshasa had
been set afire, embassy officials attacked and seriously injured. Fur-
ther, Portugal indicated it would welcome an official United Nations
investigation of alleged mercenary bases in Angola, if the Congo
would allow similar inspections of known anti-Portuguese bases in
Congolese territory. 7 The Security Council urged Portugal "not to
allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for
interfering in the domestic affairs" of the Congo.66 In 1967, Guinea,
Senegal and Zambia complained of military incursions by Portuguese
army units. 9 The Congo repeated charges that Portugal was provid-
ing and encouraging mercenary bases in Angola.76 Portugal denied the
allegations, stating that the Congo, since 1960, had openly promoted
armed aggression against Angola from within the Congo.7 The Secu-
rity Council condemned Portugal for its failure to prevent mercenar-
ies from using Angola as a base of operations.
72
D. Mozambique
In 1973, new charges of Portuguese atrocities in Mozambique by
63. U.N. Doc. S/6177 (1965); U.N. Doc. S/6196 (1965) and U.N. Doc. S/6338
(1965).
64. U.N. Doc. S/6192/Corr.1 (1965); U.N. Doc. S/6240 (1965).
65. S.C. Res. 204, 20 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/6366/Rev.1 (1965).
66. U.N. Doc. S/7503 (1966). The charges followed the dismissal of Tshombe and
coup d' etat by Mobutu in the fall of 1965.
67. U.N. Doc. S/7506 (1966). See also Marcum, Three Revolutions, AFRICA REPORT
8, 10, 12 (Nov., 1967); and ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 411.
68. S.C. Res. 266, 21 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/7539 (1966).
69. Respectively, U.N. Doc, S/8193 (1967); U.N. Doc. S/8080 (1967); U.N. Doc.
S/8151 (1967) and U.N. Doc. 7664 (1967).
70. U.N. Doc. S/8218 (1967).
71. U.N. Doc. S/8238 (1967).
72. S.C. Res. 241, 22 UN. SCOR (adopted without vote), see 1967 YEARBOOK OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 127.
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the Roman Catholic missionary order, the Missionaries of Africa
(White Fathers), reopened the controversy concerning Portuguese
military policy.7 3 Allegations of widespread massacres were detailed
in a 400-page document released by the "White Fathers" in expla-
nation of that order's withdrawal from Mozambique in May, 1971.11
The document, referring to incidents in 1971 and 1972, followed
a charge by a British Roman Catholic priest, the Rev. Adrian
Hastings, that approximately 400 civilians were massacred at
Wiliamo.15 The charges were officially denied by Lisbon and by
General Kaulza de Arriaga, Portuguese military commander in
Mozambique." The village, allegedly destroyed by Portuguese troops
after concentration of the population in fortified villages, was visited
by a team of European journalists where a "careful search of the ruins
revealed no sign of a massacre."77 The existing evidence is less than
conclusive, and complicity by many "White Fathers" with guerrilla
terrorists diminishes the impartiality of their testimony., It would
appear that massacre and atrocity are no more part of Portuguese
military policy in 1972, than in 1962.79 To the contrary, evidence
suggests a large portion of the black population consider Portuguese
authorities "too soft" on terrorists.80 More reliable information de-
picts a realistic situation wherein isolated, unauthorized incidents of
summary execution and torture of suspected terrorists have been
committed by units of the Grupo Esspeciale Paraquedistas (special
counter-terrorist paratroop group) composed mainly of black Afri-
cans and ex-guerrillas. '
Although the present failure of the "liberation movements"
within the three African terroritories enjoys many explanations, the
primary reason is that the Portuguese government retains the neu-
trality, if not the open support, of a majority of the black African
73. New York Times, July 14, 1973, at 9, col. 5.
74. Id. at col. 6.
75. Id. at col. 5.
76. Id.
77. Conspicuously absent were spent cartridges, bullet holes in trees or building
frames and signs of recent burials; see Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1973, at 4, col.
4; New York Times, Aug. 11, 1973, at 10, col. 2.
78. INTELLIGENCE DIGEST 8 (Aug., 1973).
79. See generally A. VENTER, PORTUGAL'S WAR IN GUINEA-BISSAU (1973); A.
VENTER, PORTUGAL'S GUERRILLA WAR (1973); A. VENTER, THE TERROR FIGHTERS (1970);
Dodson, Dynamics of Insurgency in Mozambique, AFRICA REPORT 52-55 (Nov. 1967);
Marcum, Three Revolutions, AFRICA REPORT 8-22 (Nov. 1967); and Zartman, Guinea:
The Quiet War Goes On, AFRICA REPORT 67-72 (Nov. 1967).
80. Supra note 78, at 8.
81. Compare e.g. Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1973, at 3, col. 5, with DER
SPIEGEL, Aug. 13, 1973, at 64-73.
1974
144 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
population. s2 The employment by Portugal of brutal repression
against the civilian population such as massacres, wide scale use of
napalm, defoliates or bombing would rapidly evaporate existing
black African support. The fact that approximately 50 percent of the
Portuguese defense forces in the territories consist of non-Europeans
further reduces the possibility that the government is utilizing civil-
ian directed methods of warfare. 83
E. Portuguese Guinea
The insurgent activity within the three African Overseas Prov-
inces which has proved most difficult for the Portuguese is the war
in Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau).'" The revolutionary African
Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands
(P.A.I.G.C.) claims to have "liberated" two-thirds of the territory
and several authorities suggest that they are actually in control of
one-half of the area. s5 Portugal maintains that "there are no 'liber-
ated areas' under the control of the P.A.I.G.C.," 86 but admits there
are some "frontier areas" rendered "unsafe by terrorists infiltrating
clandestinely from the neighboring countries giving them sanc-
tuary." 7
In 1972, the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization estab-
lished a Special Mission, composed of representatives of Equador,
Sweden and Tunisia, to visit the "liberated areas" of Portuguese
Guinea. "' Entering Portuguese Guinea without the permission of Por-
tuguese authorities and with a military contingent of the P.A.I.G.C.
on April 2, 1972, the Mission reportedly observed reconstruction pro-
grams, and social, economic, educational and other conditions in the
"liberated areas."" Upon the Mission's return to New York, the phys-
82. ABSHIRE & SAMUELS, supra note 40, at 429; and WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra
note 38, at 221. Tribal animosity has in some regions increased greatly due to the
fighting. For example, in Angola that of the Ovimbundu towards the Bakongo and
Mbundu who massacred them in 1961; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 230.
Also see generally address by Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, The Only
Road Open to Us is to Defend Our Overseas Provinces, broadcast on Portuguese televi-
sion, Jan. 15, 1973 (available from Portuguese Embassy); Wheeler, The Thaw in Portu-
gal, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769-781 (1970); and Howe, Portugal at War: Hawks, Doves and
Owls, AFRICA REPORT 16-21 (Nov. 1969).
83. The 50 percent figure includes regular Metropole troops, militia, para-military
groups and police; see Address by Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Rui Patricio,
conveniently found in 99 CONG. REc. S4948 (1971).
84. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1973, at 15, col. 1; see generally A. VENTER,
PORTUGAL'S WAR IN GUINEA-BISSAU (1973).
85. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1973, at 15, col. 1.
86. PORTUGUESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MISSION INVISIBLE 31 (1972).
87. Id. at 46.




ical evidence offered by the photographer who accompanied the Mis-
sion did not indicate any place identifiable as Portuguese Guinea, nor
anything more than photographs of Mission representatives meeting
with African natives in jungle areas.90 In response to the Mission's
report, the Special Committee on Decolonization approved a resolu-
tion condemning Portugal. The Committee found that the P.A.I.G.C.
is the "only authentic representative of the territory" which, in its
opinion, "some States are prepared to recognize."'" Portugal con-
tested the findings of the Special Mission and invited the Secretary
General,"2 the President of the General Assembly,9 3 and the Security
Council 4 to designate a mission to visit Portuguese Guinea to deter-
mine the existence of "liberated areas. 9 5 The invitations were either
rejected or ignored.99
In September 1973, a Popular National Assembly, under the
sponsorship of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and
the Cape Verde Islands, proclaimed the independence of the "liber-
ated areas" of Portuguese Guinea. 7 Since then, approximately 70
African, Asian and communist nations have recognized the new terri-
tory. Currently, there is discussion in the General Assembly and the
Special Committee on Decolonization on whether to seat representa-
tives of the "liberated areas" on United Nations agencies and its
admission to the United Nations. However, since admission will
depend upon the recommendation of the Security Council, it does not
appear likely that the "liberated" territory will be admitted in the
foreseeable future.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom,
has stated that the "independent areas" of Portuguese Guinea do not
at this time possess the necessary attributes of a state to enable
recognition by the United States.9 Since "recognition [of] a country
90. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/L.768 (1972).
91. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/400 (1972).
92. May 8, 1972.
93. October 2, 24, 1972; October 11, 1973.
94. October 11, 1973.
95. Statement by Portuguese Representative, Antonio Patricio, before the United
Nations General Assembly, Oct. 22, 1973.
96. Id.
97. The Proclamation of the State of Guinea-Bissau by the People's National
Assembly on Sept. 24, 1973 may be found in U.N. Doc. A/9196, Annex I, at 1 (1973).
The Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau may be found in U.N. Doc. A/9196,
Annex II, at 1 (1973).
98. Statement by Portuguese Representative, Antonio Patricio, before the United
Nations General Assembly, Oct. 22, 1973.
99. Address by David D. Newsom, African Studies Association Annual Meeting,
Nov. 2, 1973. "The State as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and
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still in the throes of warfare against the parent state . . . constitutes
participation in the conflict [and] makes the cause of independence
a common one between the aspirant for it and the outside State,''""
the United States will not seriously consider recognition until the
insurgent movement in Portuguese Guinea clearly demonstrates that
it exercises control upon a recognizably substantial part of the terri-
tory and population of Portuguese Guinea. However, on October 22,
1973, the General Assembly welcomed the accession to independence
of the "liberated areas" by the creation of the Republic of Guinea-
Bissau and condemned Portugal for perpetuating its "illegal" occu-
pation of and aggression against the Republic of Guinea-Bissau."°0
IV. THE BLACK LEGEND REVISITED
Since 1960, various nations in the General Assembly have at-
tempted to combine the problems of Angola and Mozambique with
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia by charges against Portugal of
racism, forced labor, inhumane labor conditions and the exportation
of black workers to South Africa. The creation by the General Assem-
bly of such a "Southern African Problem," requiring a uniform ap-
proach by that organization, can only result in unfortunate conse-
quences for the people of Portuguese Africa. The situation in Angola
and Mozambique is essentially different from that in South Africa
and Southern Rhodesia.
A. Racism
The Portuguese territories do not experience legislation such as
the Land Apportionment Act of Southern Rhodesia nor the "Jim
Crow" laws formerly found in the United States.'0 There is no de jure
discrimination in employment, education or housing, and there is a
corresponding lack of de facto discrimination.1' 3 In areas where admi-
ration for South African and Rhodesian society at times emerges,
primarily due to their greater economic and technological advance-
ment, antiracist propaganda is freely transmitted by government
d) capacity to enter into relations with other States." Convention on Rights and Duties
of States, Montevideo, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881.
100. C. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 153 (1947).
101. G.A. Res. 3061, 28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/L.702. The following Member
States voted "no" on the resolution: Brazil,*Greece, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The following Member States abstained on
the resolution: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Den-
mark, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Guate-
mala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
102. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 212.
103. Kennan, Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa, 49 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218, 231
(1971) [hereinafter cited as KENNAN].
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agencies through official information organs. 104 Miscengenation is not
only accepted by a large majority of Portuguese, but is actively en-
couraged as an important aspect of official government policy."'1 Ar-
nold Toynbee writes:
You will see there people with Goanese and African blood in their veins.
It is evident that they feel themselves to be Portuguese and are felt to be
Portuguese by their European-blooded fellow citizens . . . the freedom
of the . . . Portuguese speaking peoples from race feeling is an unques-
tionable fact.'"
An increasing and significant portion of the population in the Over-
seas Provinces is of African-European descent (mesticos).107
The various insurgent movements in Portuguese Africa contin-
ually assert racism in the administration of the Provinces, and such
allegations find widespread acceptance in Afro-Asian and liberal
Western communities. However, the disparity between the great ma-
jority of black Africans and the more prosperous Europeans, Asians
and mesticos results from a corresponding disparity in educational
opportunity."5 In the territories, education, not race, is the avenue to
prosperity and the greatest governmental reforms have occurred in
the field of education. " " George F. Kennan writes:
it is difficult . . . to believe that a triumph of the present insurgent
pressures would produce any more rapid progress in educational oppor-
tunities and living standards for the African. In both these respects the
Portuguese territories are already well ahead of most of the black-ruled
countries in Africa.""
The Portuguese policy, in relation to aboriginal populations
within its territories, has been criticized as a concealed form of racism
despite similar practices by other nations and recognition by the
International Labor Organization of such methods to protect aborigi-
nal peoples. " ' Government dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of
104. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 213.
105. Id. at 202-203.
106. Toynbee, A War of Races? No., New York Times, Aug. 7, 1960, at 56, col. 1;
see also Kay, The Portuguese Way in Africa, FORTUNE 112-115, 139-142 (Jan. 1964).
107. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 1.
108. KENNAN, supra note 103, at 231. Mesticos are the indigenous population of
the island provinces off the African continent which were uninhabited when reached
by the Portuguese.
109. Id. at 232. R. Pelissier terms the educational reforms in Angola "a scholastic
explosion." In 1961, there were 105,701 Angolans in primary schools, 4,501 in technical
secondary schools and 7,486 in academic secondary schools. In 1967, the figures were
267,768; 15,371 and 16,700 respectively with 702 pursuing theological studies and 607
attending university in Angola; see WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note 38, at 237.
110. KENNAN, supra note 103, at 232; see also WHEELER & PELISSIER, supra note
38, at 237; and Sammuels, The 'New Look' in Angolan Education, AFRICA REPORT 63-
66 (Nov. 1967).
111. A. EDWARDS, THE OVlMBUNDU UNDER Two SOVEREIGNTIES 136 (1962).
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official assimilation methods led to repeal of the Native Statute in
1961. Under present legislation, any African may, without fee or test,
retain a traditional life style under special protection of law or adopt
full legal rights and obligations of Portuguese citizenship."2
B. Labor Conditions
In 1961, Ghana filed charges with the International Labor Organ-
ization against Portugal claiming that forced labor existed in Angola
and Mozambique in conditions worse than slavery and that over
100,000 Mozambicans were forceably exported to South African
mines. Acting upon the complaint, the I.L.O. established a commis-
sion to examine labor conditions in Portuguese Africa. The commis-
sion notified Ghana its complaint was unsupported by evidence."'
Yet in 1966, the General Assembly condemned, "as a crime against
humanity," Portugal's policy of exportation of workers to South Af-
rica.'" During 1970, Pierre Juvigny, the I.L.O. special representative
on labor conditions in Portuguese Africa, made personal investiga-
tions of Angola and Mozambique, similar to the original I.L.O. exam-
ination in 1962. He reiterated the nonexistence of forced labor and
forced exportation of workers to South Africa, The report concluded:
the Portuguese authorities appear to be fully aware of the need to develop
further the series of policies which they have been pursuing in recent
times . . . [theyl have repeatedly referred to I.L.O. standards as rein-
forcing the legal basis of their decisions. " '
Definitive reform of the labor system in Portuguese Africa began
in 1960 with the creation of minimum wages, labor inspections, revo-
cation of criminal penalties for breach of work contracts and ratifica-
tion of the I.L.O. Convention on Child Labor and Abolition of Forced
Labor."6 During 1961, the prohibition of labor recruitment by govern-
ment officials, equal pay irrespective of race or sex and freedom of
choice of work was extended to all rural and unskilled urban workers
through the Code of Rural Labor. The Code also provides for free
housing, food and transportation for rural workers; compulsory acci-
dent and illness insurance; collective bargaining; eight hour work day
and 48 hour work week; and precludes labor for children under 14
years of age (16 years in some occupations) and six hour work day for
112. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 166-167; see generally A. WILENSKY,
TRENDS IN PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS LEGISLATION FOR AFRICA (F. Holliday transl. 1971).
113. ILO, OFFICIAL BULL., XLV, No. 2, Supp. II at 231-234 (April 1962). The
commission, composed of high court justices from Senegal, Switzerland and Uruguay
reviewed documented evidence and made on-the-spot investigations traveling 9,000
kilometers through Angola and Mozambique by an unannounced itinerary.
114. G.A. Res. 2184, 21 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6554 (1966).
115. U.N. Doc. E/L.1403 (1970).
116. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 168-169.
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children under 18 years of age. Penalties for violations are exten-
sive."'
The emigration of native African labor to factories and mines in
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia constitutes a special problem
for Mozambique. Migration from the Lourenco Marques area has
continued for over 100 years. The reason is simply economic. Wages
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are significantly higher than
in Mozambique."" Immediate prohibition of labor emigration would
cause severe economic hardship for a significant percentage of the
black African population of Southern Mozambique. Recognized as a
serious problem by Portugal, the situation is being alleviated by im-
proved working opportunities and conditions, which have reduced the
number of emigrants to 250,000 per year (of which approximately
100,000 are estimated to be illegal). Strong criminal sanctions exist
to prohibit illegal labor emigration."19
V. THE UNITED NATIONS BOYCOTT
In 1965, the General Assembly proposed what was considered the
final solution to Portuguese involvement in Africa. The Assembly
adopted a Fourth Committee resolution whereby it: (1) constituted
the Portuguese presence in Africa a "threat to international peace
and security;" (2) recognized the legitimacy of the black nationalist
"struggle" and "appealed" to all nations to cooperate with the Or-
ganization of African Unity to supply moral and material support; (3)
condemned exportation of workers to South Africa; (4) urged all
member states to sever or refrain from establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with Portugal; (5) urged the closure of sea ports to all Portu-
guese vessels and those in the service of Portugal; and (6) urged
member states to prohibit their ships from entering ports in Portugal
and its "colonial territories," and to boycott all trade with Portugal.
20
The General Assembly boycott of Portuguese trade, vessels and
sea ports was, from the outset, unrealistic and a predictable failure.
The Portuguese Overseas Provinces constitute international, geostra-
tegic centers too important for many Western nations to boycott
under contemporary circumstances. The Azores and Madeira islands,
lying on the intercontinental air route, provide sites for a United
States naval air station, outer space tracking facility and strategi-
cally important NATO projects. Cape Verde is a geostrategic point
117. Id. For English text see Rural Labour Code for Portuguese Overseas Prov-
inces, 86 INT'L LAB. REv. 285-293 (1962).
118. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 173-174.
119. Id.
120. G.A. Res. 2107, 20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6209 (1965). African nations
gave serious consideration to economic sanctions against Portugal in early 1962. D.
WATT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1962 492-493 (1970).
1974
150 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
for air and shipping routes between Europe, Africa and South and
North America. The Portuguese territories in Southern Africa pro-
vide an important transportation infrastructure for its neighbors and
the international community. The railways and ports of Angola and
Mozambique afford virtually the only access to the copper resources
of central Africa and the landlocked nations of Zaire and Zambia., ',
Approximately half of the United States importation of maganese
ore, cobalt, uranium ore, natural gems, industrial diamonds and one-
third of its chromite, platinum group metals and coffee come from
nations dependant upon the transportation network in Angola and
Mozambique.'2 Portugal's fellow NATO members and a significant
proportion of African nations were, understandably, unwilling to ef-
fect such a boycott.1
23
The economic boycott having failed, the General Assembly con-
tinued procedures designed to deny Portugal access to United Na-
tions agencies and other international organizations. 4 In 1964, Afri-
can delegates walked out of the International Conference of Public
Education and the U.N. Trade and Development Conference in Ge-
neva. Later that year, Portugal was expelled from the U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa, and the executive committee of UNESCO
barred Portugal from the International Conference of Public Educa-
tion and the International Conference on Illiteracy. 125 During 1965,
the General Assembly recommended that the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary
Fund refuse Portugal financial, economic or technical assistance. 2 6 In
1966, the World Health Assembly suspended Portugal from partici-
pation in the Regional Committee for Africa.
127
VI. CONCLUSION
Societies exist in time more than in space. At any given moment a state
is but a collection of individuals . . . But it achieves identity through the
consciousness of a common history. This is the only 'experience' nations
have . . . History is the memory of states.'8
The history of Portugal traces an involvement in Africa which
dates from before the discovery of America.129 From that time, Portu-
121. See generally Hance, Three Economies, AFRICA REPORT 23-30 (Nov. 1967).
122. OVERSEAS COMPANIES OF PORTUGAL, PORTUGAL: INFRASTRUCTURE 3 (1971).
123. The General Assembly vote was 66 to 26 with 15 abstentions.
124. ABSHIRE & SAMMUELS, supra note 40, at 383.
125. Id.
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127. WHO Press Release, WP/31, May 27, 1966, at 4.
128. H. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED 331 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
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gal consolidated its national identity as a multi-racial, multi-
cultural, transcontinental sovereignty. The debate in the United Na-
tions concerning the international status and destiny of the Portu-
guese Overseas Provinces spans nearly two decades. Within five years
from its admission to the United Nations, Portugal witnessed the
dismemberment of that identity by passage of Resolution 1542 (XV)
in the General Assembly. An act which, to obtain the acquiescence
of Portugal, would have required the "amputation of [its] national
memory.""" If, during this time, Portugal is to be judged recalcitrant,
its critics are equally guilty of gross distortion and rejection of a
fundamental tenet of legitimate international settlement, namely
that "diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition." '' Aside
from whatever influence the internationalization of Portugal's policy
may have had in the implementation of reforms in the Overseas
Provinces, the primary achievement of United Nations action re-
mains the collective legitimation of the insurgent movements and the
anti-Portuguese foreign policy of its member nations.
Carl A. Anderson
130. The phrase is Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn's. THE NOBEL LECTURE ON LITERA-
TURE 21 (T. Whitney transl. 1972).
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